| River: | Boulder Creek, South |
| Section: | 2. Pinecliffe to Gross Mountain Reservoir (USB) |
| Location: | Gash Rapid |
| Relevant Photos: | 10853 |
| Gauge: | 400 cfs |
| Water Level: | Medium |
| Difficulty: | V |
| Accident Code(s): | Pin: Undercut Trap |
| Injury Code(s): | Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal, Fatal |
| Age: | 50 |
| Experienced/Inexperienced: | Experienced |
| Years Paddling: | >10 |
| Private/Commercial: | Private |
| Boat Type: | Kayak - Creek Boat |
| Boat Manufacturer: | Prijon |
| Boat Model: | Embudo |
| Number of Occupants: | 1 |
| Number in Group: | 7 |
| Number of Victims: | 1 |
| Hazard Codes: | Natural Strainer or Sieve, Hydraulic/Keeper Hole |
| Summary: | Upper South Boulder Creek, a difficult class V creek run in Colorado's Front Range was running 400 cfs, a moderate flow, on June 8. A group of five experienced kayakers were joined by two more kayakers after the first rapid and before "The Gash", the second Class V rapid of the run. "The Gash" (http://www.americanwhitewater.org/photos/?size=big&photoid=10853) is often portaged because it contains several nasty sieves and undercuts. Paul Zirkelbach, second in the group, headed into the rapid as the rest of his group was getting out to portage. Zirkelbach, 50, was a well-known expedition paddler with decades of experience and was very familiar with the run. He chose, as many paddlers often do, to rely on memory rather than scouting. As the group made the portage, they spotted his kayak vertically pinned on an undercut rock at the bottom. The group making a high risk effort, quickly released the boat, but there was no sign of Paul or any gear. The group began an all-out search with one paddler going downstream incase Zirkelbach had washed through. The remaining 5 boaters probed the rapid with a snag-line. After about an hour, a hike watching the rescue, spotted what looked like a blue backpack washing out of the left side of the Gash, but was unable to alert the rescue party. Three fishermen who were helping with the search downstream located Paul's body minutes later. The evacuation from this steep-walled canyon required three hours of work by several rescue teams working from the railroad bed. None of the boaters who accompanied Zirkelbach actually saw what happened to him in "The Gash." His friends theorize that he bailed out after being hammered somewhere in the drop, then he was held up in a sieve or undercut rock for some time before being released. It's unclear exactly where his run went wrong, or whether pre-positioned safety would have made any difference. He was found with his life vest and full-coverage helmet still on.--------- |
| Detailed Description: | -----Report prepared by Gary Edgeworth June 8, 2002 was a beautiful CO day. Our group of 5 met for a run down Upper South Boulder Creek (USB), which is west of Boulder, CO. USB was at a medium flow around 400 cfs. We put on around noon with blue skies and the sun shining on our faces. We had all run USB for years as one of our staple class V local creek runs. The group had close to a hundred years of combined experience. |
| Conclusions: | -----Prepared by Tim Kelley AW Safety Chair: I write the following conclusions not in judgment of Paul or his action, but in the "matter fact" clarity that was Zirk. Paul took me down my first class V 18 years before his death, we had paddled dozens of times since and most recently just a few weeks before his death. One of the many things I liked about paddling with Zirk was his candid honesty. It is that candor which I draw on not in judgment of his actions, but to highlight that a paddler's decision...your decisions and mine, affect the safety of others we paddle with. This accident is also a great example of how to conduct a rescue and body recovery safely. Certain rapids demand a "look" especially those with such consequences and marginal landings. Gages are not the most accurate, +/- 10%. 40cfs in small channels can make all the difference between clean and getting hammered. Rivers change and debris can make any rapid a hazard. Take the few extra minutes for a quick look, especially on complex rapids with consequence. There is no guareentee that even if Paul had at least waited for Gary to take a quick look or get eyes on, that this accident would have turned out any different, but the risks to the group would have been far less. Paul chose to run a "familiar" drop without scouting or setting safety...sound familiar? By doing so Paul left little to no room for error given the objective hazards of this rapid. For all intensive purposes he paddled this drop solo with the exception of the risk to his group as they attempted to rescue him. As Charlie Ebel, another friend of Paul's said, "no rescue is without risk." By not allowing at least one group member to have eyes on the drop, the group had no idea of what happened to Paul. If they saw him bail from his boat or an empty cockpit before the boat pinnded, they would not have taken the risks they did to get his boat. Watching what happened helps greatly in developing a search plan. If he had washed free of the rapid and the group didn't know this, they would have been taking serious risks for no reason. The fact that Paul did wash free after an hour reinforces the need to keep someone below the drop watching for this if you have enough people. Having someone below can also provide safety for the rescue group if positioned properly. The group did factor this in first by Gary going down stream to a logical point from which to start working back up stream. Using the fishermen below was critical to the body recovery. The female hiker unable to get the rescuers attention underscores the need for whistles to get someone's attention over the noise of a 400cfs creek. The members of this group did all they safely could to rescue Paul and far more. They had all the equipment and skill they needed. They had each others back both physically and mentally keeping the rescue "safe". The group wanted me to reinforce the importance of the following items. Whistles were critical for even close communication, rescue life jackets were critical to all members of the rescue party at some point. All paddlers having throw ropes was critical and waist bags made searching down river from shore much easier. Only a large Parabiner easily clipped the plastic grab loop. Good river shoes allowed shore movement to be quick and safe. Most importantly the group fought through the emotions of admitting Paul was dead and shifting from "rescue" to body recovery reducing the level of acceptable risk. The cold snowmelt runoff, even on a warm sunny Jun afternoon at 7500 feet zapped the energy of those searching in the water. These were experienced locals. Those coming to CO on paddling vacation should factor in affects of elevation. The evacuation of the body involved two different counties, required railroad assistance and took over three hours to get out of the gorge. AW and CWWA worked w/ the authorities to improve future rescue/evacuation procedures. A healthy respect was developed as a result. This accident had no adverse affects to the final FERC settlement allowing egress off USB across Gross Reservoir. As I watched Zirk's ashes float down the South Platte with tears behind my sunglasses, a smile crossed my face. I knew Paul was laughing at us and would have told us, "get over it!" He would have apologized to Gary, Gordo, Scott and the others for putting them at risk. I promised myself I would think a little harder about how my own decision-making might put others at risk. It wasn't that I ignore that, but I decided I wanted to factor it a little higher. Vios Condios Mi Amigo |
| Link: | http://boatertalk.com/forum/AW/192718 |
| Report Status: | Completed |