Marsh Creek Accident Report
submitted by Jack Rich and others in the group
Trip Overview
Two private boating groups launched on Marsh Creek at approximately 9:00 a.m. and planned to run Marsh Creek together. The group involving the victim planned to continue through Marsh Creek, the Middle Fork Salmon, Main Salmon, and Lower Salmon as part of a longer expedition. The second group, consisting of four rafts, planned to continue through the Middle Fork Salmon and Main Salmon.
One group was outfitted for approximately seven days and included overnight and cooking gear as well as:
Two kayaks
One cataraft
One 14-foot raft
One 16-foot raft
Six 5watt Rocky Talkie radios transmitting on channel 21 distributed among boats
Safety equipment including:
Drysuits or drywear
Helmets (WRSI Current, WRSI Trident, NRS Neso)
Rescue PFD’s (Astral Greenjacket, NRS Zen) as well as some non-rescue PFD’s
2 Harken CRx2 Pulleys
Locking carabiners (Black Diamond Hot Forge Screwgate Carabiners, CAMP Photon Lock Carabiners, and NRS NUQ Carabiners), 1” tubular webbing, and prusik materials
Throw Bags (1 Kokatat Huck Throw Bag, 1 Astral Compact Throw Bag, 1 NRS Standard Rescue Throw Bag, 1 NRS Pro Rescue Throw Bag, and several NRS Compact Throw Bags)
2x 10’ Bluewater Titan Anchor Runner
Garmin InReach
The second group was appropriately outfitted for approximately four days and carried additional rescue and wood-management equipment, including a wood saw.
There was no alcohol or drugs present or consumed before or throughout the duration of the trip. Adequate PPE (drysuits or drywear, PFDs, helmets, and footwear) were worn at all appropriate times by participants.
Both groups planned to run the initial stretch of river together.
The combined group consisted almost entirely of experienced river guides with years of experience on Marsh Creek, Middle Fork Salmon, Main Salmon, Lower Salmon, and Cataract Canyon. Several participants were current or former lead guides and held extensive swiftwater rescue training beyond standard ACA swiftwater courses. One rescuer had recently completed an EMT certificate as well as another rescuer who is a current medical school student.
The victim was an experienced kayaker with two years of commercial raft guiding experience and extensive swiftwater rescue training. He had paddled rivers throughout the Mountain West and had been steadily building experience and competency in class IV and V whitewater.
The victim was outfitted in an NRS Jakl drysuit, WRSI Current helmet, Astral Greenjacket with an NRS Tow Tether attached to the appropriate quick release points (this was confirmed in a video from earlier that day), Astral Loyak shoes, and an Immersion Research KlingOn Bungee sprayskirt.
Participants reported unusually heavy wood conditions throughout Marsh Creek. Far more than previous years. River levels were at 4.75ft at the Middle Fork Lodge at the time of the accident.
Throughout the day, kayakers frequently traveled ahead of the raft groups to scout wood hazards and communicate river conditions using radios.
Approximately 1.5 miles above the Bear Valley Creek and Marsh Creek confluence, the group encountered a major wood obstruction in the “Crux Rapid” requiring an extended portage. Participants described the portage as physically exhausting and time intensive, involving repeated carrying, maneuvering, and relaunching of heavily loaded rafts over roughly one-half mile of difficult terrain.
Boats were relaunched individually through a narrow slot, with only one raft able to pass at a time.
Accident Sequence
At the time of the accident, the two kayakers were traveling alone behind the rest of the group after remaining behind to help relaunch the heavy rafts into a more mellow section of river below the portage.
During a particularly woody and complex section of river in the evening hours, the patient overturned on a log. The patient in his kayak went under the log before attempting to roll. The other kayaker stated that the patient rolled up after two attempts and initially appeared stable before the kayak began taking on additional water.
The patient was paddling a Jackson Gnarvana Medium kayak equipped with an Immersion Research spray skirt and an Astral GreenJacket rescue PFD. The spray skirt imploded or released during these events, possibly involving contact with wood, though the exact cause remains unknown.
Participants noted that repeated portaging, frequent entering and exiting of boats, cumulative fatigue, difficult river conditions, and prolonged exposure throughout the day may all have been contributing factors.
The other kayaker reported that the patient aggressively attempted to maneuver the heavily swamped kayak toward shore and slower-moving water. Although he came close to river left in an area where a swim to shore may have been possible, there was not a clearly defined recovery eddy available.
Participants later believed the patient may have continued attempting to maintain control of the kayak rather than abandoning it in the current.
As the swamped kayak continued downstream, it contacted a log angled down from the right bank into the current. Estimated to be approximately 20 inches in diameter. The other kayaker described the impact as violent, with the kayak twisting and rolling underneath the log. The kayak was quickly pulled off of him by the force of the current. The kayaker with the patient later stated that he did not observe the patient actively struggle or move following the impact.
The patient became entrapped beneath the log approximately two feet underwater in a deep, fast-moving section of current roughly one-half mile above the Bear Valley Creek and Marsh Creek confluence.
Witnesses later reported that the patient’s body had largely passed beyond the log while something on the patient’s PFD appeared to remain snagged beneath the log. (Location: (44.44695, -115.22263))
The kayaker with the patient immediately pulled over on river left, and radioed the downstream group requesting immediate assistance. Those in the group downstream recovered the kayak.
Emergency communication efforts included radio traffic between river groups, activation of the SOS function on a Garmin InReach, as well as iPhone satellite emergency messaging to 911 due to the remoteness of the incident location. Messages were sent immediately after the other kayaker radioed about the situation.
Due to the nature of the channel and limited available eddies, the raft groups had already eddied out below the confluence, waiting for the kayakers. The rafters were eddied out on the same side of the river as Bear valley creek (left) (Location: (44.44982, -115.23115)), which initially impeded efforts to get upriver to the scene of the accident. The rafters had to ferry across to river right (Location: (44.45015, -115.23065)) to be able to traverse up the shore to the scene.
Once boats had been ferried to river right, rescuers then began moving ropes, rescue gear, and personnel back upriver toward the entrapment location as quickly as possible.
Rescue Efforts
The first rescuers arrived about 20 minutes after the initial radio call for help was made due to the rough terrain, downed trees, and cliffs. Rescuers immediately initiated multiple rescue attempts using throw bags, tensioned rope systems, and alternative rigging strategies. The first rescue attempts included the first people on scene walking out onto the log as far as possible and jumping to try and grab onto the patient to pull him off the log. After 5-6 failed attempts at this, several of the rescuers had swam across to river left.
The second type of attempts occurred after there were rescuers on both sides of the river. The rescuers attempted to get a rope cinch under the log with weighted throw bags. After several attempts of setting up the cinch, one attempt appeared to wrap around the patient. But no amount or angle of pulling resulted in any change. Rescue attempts using this method proved difficult as a result of the fast current speed which prevented the rope from getting under the water enough.
Participants stated that rescue attempts directly into the primary entrapment zone were aborted due to the significant risk of secondary entrapment involving additional rescuers.
After these attempts had been made rescuers radioed back to the remaining rafters to bring the hand saw to the scene. While waiting for the saw, the group continued evaluating rescue options. Participants stated that radio communication between the river groups was crucial throughout the rescue effort.
Once the saw arrived, rescuers began cutting the log. Participants reported that the cutting process was physically difficult due to the size of the log.
The log was not fully severed but was cut sufficiently that it flexed and shifted downstream into a somewhat reduced-current position, improving rescuer access.
After the log shifted position, two rescuers attempted to pull the patient from the water, but he remained attached to the log. They placed a carabiner on the patient’s lifejacket and attached it to a line held by rescuers on the left bank. A rescuer on the right bank cut him free, and the rescuers on river left pulled the patient and the rescuer to the left shore. The rescue swimmer later confirmed that a kayak tow tether had been the primary entrapment point. The metal tether ring remained attached to the patient’s rescue belt during the rescue.
Witnesses reported observing blood from the patient’s nose during recovery as well as a potentially fresh impact mark on his helmet. Several participants later believed the impact with the log may have rendered him unconscious immediately following the collision, though this could not be definitively confirmed.
Upon moving the patient to a flat spot, his PFD and drysuit were removed and CPR was initiated around 8:30 PM and continued for approximately three hours. The sun had set behind the ridge meaning direct light was unavailable at this point and water temp was around mid to low 40 degrees Fahrenheit. The patient was in Stage 4 (Revised Swiss System) hypothermic cardiac arrest and had been submerged from between 45 minutes to an hour. The water temperature was around 45 degrees and the air temperature was about 50. The patient presented symptoms of drowning including a blue face, no pulse, and no respiration.
Upon initiating CPR, rescuers on river right called for materials to assemble a double vapor barrier hypothermia wrap (mylar blanket, sleeping bag, and tarp) as well as a lighter. A lighter was acquired from two nearby backpackers who later joined rescue efforts by shuttling gear from the confluence to the accident site.
Prior to medical assistance arriving, rescuers on both sides worked to get a dry bag with the previously mentioned supplies across to river left by throwing a throw bag across the river attached to the dry bag. Once the dry bag was crossed, sleeping bags were placed under and over the patient while continuing CPR.
In an effort to warm the patient, one of the 5 rescuers on river left joined him in the sleeping bags and blankets with as much skin-to-skin contact as possible. While the 4 other rescuers continued to give CPR. The rescuers also started a fire near the patient to give additional warmth while also creating a signal for search and rescue to find them. The patient’s life jacket, drysuit, and clothes were cut off of him before placing him in the sleeping bags.
Initial air medical personnel and flight paramedics deployed from St. Luke’s Medical in Sun Valley responded rapidly to the area but were limited by terrain, landing access, and the technical swiftwater environment. Due to the canyon terrain, responders were required to land farther away on the opposite side of the river and hike into the scene. Participants noted that the responding medical personnel had limited swiftwater rescue capability and were unable to provide significant direct assistance, though their rapid response efforts were appreciated. The personnel did not provide any additional instruction beyond working with rescuers on river right to devise a way to cross the river. After a time and a determination that it would no longer be safe to transfer personnel from right to left (it was now well into being dark) the medical personnel and rescuers on the left worked to rig a high-line pulley system. This system was intended to retrieve the patient from river left to river right to begin defibrillation.
At approximately 11:30 PM the high line had been set up and anchored on both sides of the river. The patient’s body had been moved to the high line system where he would be hauled across the river. A makeshift harness (NRS strap, PFD, and helmet) was used to attach him to the high line. The rescuers were attaching the patient to the pulley system when, at approximately midnight, an Idaho Army National Guard Blackhawk helicopter arrived on scene without any warning and no perceived communication with EMS personnel on site. Rescuers stated the helicopter’s arrival was initially shocking due to the extreme noise, bright lights, rotor wash, and water spray generated within the narrow canyon environment.
The National Guard medic was airdropped at the location of the group’s campsite on river right, where the fellow rafters tried to point the helicopter to the site of the victim. Once on the ground, the National Guard Medic asked for the patient’s whereabouts. Backpackers took the medic upriver where the rescuers were located. The medic was then picked up by the helicopter and transported to river left at the scene with the victim. The rescuers moved the patient’s body back up from the high-line rig and helped the National Guard personnel to prepare the patient’s body for extraction.
The helicopter conducted a nighttime extraction operation involving cable-supported personnel deployment under difficult canyon conditions. The Army National Guard medic arrived on river left and asked the rescuers to bring the patient to him. He asked the rescuers if the patient had a pulse and was responsive. Two rescuers vocally confirmed he had no pulse and was not responsive. The medic did not check vitals and proceeded to strap him into the body-bag for an airlift.
Participants described the flight crew as extremely rapid, professional, and highly effective while operating in a difficult environment. Witnesses noted that the crew gave clear commands and executed the extraction quickly despite the remoteness and technical nature of the incident.
Participants involved in CPR and shoreline operations experienced significant cold exposure from prolonged springtime river conditions combined with rotor wash and water spray from the helicopter. Some rescuers positioned well above the river reported still being heavily soaked by the rotor wash. One participant directly involved in CPR near the shoreline became mildly hypothermic (Stage 2 Revised Swiss System) during the extraction phase. Following patient extraction by helicopter, EMS personnel from St. Luke’s inquired about the rescuers’ capability to self-rescue before returning to their aircraft. Rescuers then coordinated the transfer of food and sleeping supplies from river right to rescuers on river left, who established a bivy and fire for the night.
The rescuers also repositioned the highline rope system to a distance of about 10-15ft above water level to prevent possible entrapment overnight or the following morning.
The following morning, rescuers on river right delivered food and retrieved gear from river left using the same highline rope system before dismantling the rope system and returning to camp. Rescuers used an upstream spotter to maintain river safety during this process. The process was successful and without incident.
Rescuers on river left hiked to the confluence of Bear Creek and Marsh Creek before being extracted with throw bags from river right or swimming to the eddy just below the confluence on river right (Location: 44.45015, -115.23065). A safety kayaker, as well as multiple rescuers with throwbags, were on standby during this time. Participants were later either evacuated or self-rescued at Dagger Falls.
The patient was later pronounced deceased.
Posted April 1- Missoula Whitewater Community – Zach Wolfe
One kayaker has died after getting stuck under logs on Marsh Creek, reports the Custer County Sheriff’s Office.
Author: Zoe Tuttle KTVB7, Boise ID
May 7, 2026
CUSTER COUNTY, Idaho — Several Idaho agencies worked together on a multi-day rescue of a group of kayakers from the Marsh Creek area. According to a social media post from Custer County Sheriff’s Office, the incident began on May 5, around 7:50 p.m. The Valley County Sheriff’s Office alerted Custer County to reports of a kayaker stuck under logs on Marsh Creek. Just five minutes after receiving the report, Custer County Search and Rescue were deployed.
The social post states that around the 8:39 p.m. time frame, the sheriff’s office was told that CPR had been started by other kayakers in the group. Air St. Luke’s Medical helicopter was dispatched from Wood River; however, the terrain did not allow for a landing. That’s when the Idaho National Guard was deployed. The National Guard was able to retrieve the patient and bring him to an ambulance at the Boundary Creek parking lot along Highway 75.
The patient did not survive the incident. At this time, the name of the deceased has not been publicly released due to pending notification to the family.
Then, on May 6, the Spokane Valley Sheriff’s Office provided a helicopter to resume search-and-rescue efforts, helping get more of the rafting party out of the wilderness. Law enforcement explains that the rafting group still had to get equipment down the river, so some group members were replaced by new members.
On May 7, around 11:30 a.m., efforts continue to retrieve the eight remaining rafting members. The Custer County Sheriff’s Office extends its condolences to the family and friends of the deceased.