CLOSE CALL ON A FLOODED FRENCH BROAD RIVER
SUMMARY: Four students in a ACA Level 4 whitewater canoe instructor training class had a very close call on a flooded river. The incident is a textbook example of how people who absolutely knew better could allow themselves to get talked into doing something unreasonably dangerous by someone in authority.
DATE: April 19, 2019, the third day of our L4 instructor training class
LOCATION: French Broad Section IX.
The flow was 5,000 cfs on the Hot Springs gauge that morning. Heavy rain overnight caused the river to flash. It was climbing when we launched, on its way to peaking at 60,000 cfs at 9pm that evening.
The class participants rendezvoused that morning at the Hot Springs take-out. We left three vehicles there and drove upstream. We put on at Barnard. The current had become much more powerful by the time we reached Stackhouse. We got out there. Each of us inspected the river from different vantage points on the shore. We considered whether to get off the river or continue to Hot Springs.
It was evident how quickly the river was rising. We watched the water steadily rise up the concrete steps on the hillside at Stackhouse over a matter of minutes. The students seemed to be of one mind that we should get off the river and try to hitchhike back to our cars.
Our instructor persuaded us to continue downstream. We recall him saying to the group "I want you to know what you're capable of." One student refused and took off at Stackhouse. The other four students (five counting the guy getting recertified) continued downstream with Eli.
The flow was enormous. I worked to avoid several large logs floating in the current and thought "This isn't good." I was missing all the moves I attempted to make by a mile. Capsizing and rolling up several times drained my energy. I was fatigued and scared. The speed and force of the current overwhelmed my attempts to maneuver the swamped canoe.
Coming around a right-turn bend where the river was banking off the left side, I saw that I was speeding toward an immense wall of water that resembled a tsunami wave in a disaster movie. Our instructor was in the foreground, dwarfed by the wall of water behind him. He had pivoted around to face me and was casually gesturing with two fingers extended, doing a subtle wrist flick toward river left. My canoe went up that wall of water and capsized again at the top. That time I came out of my boat.
Ryan, Viki, and Caleb had also come out of their boats at some point. The four of us got marooned on what had been two small adjacent islands. By that point they were just a few skinny trees sticking up out of the water. Woody debris mobilized by the floodwater was accumulating into a pile of logs at the upstream end of each island. The four students washed up onto those heaps of flotsam.
Our instructor was at the island when I collided. He assisted the swimmers up out of the water and verified that each of us was okay for the time being. Then he continued downstream to chase our boats.
Two of us were on the smaller of the two islands. Two others were on the other island. Each pair of castaways could clearly see the other pair but were too far part to communicate verbally.
The situation felt precarious. I stood on the raft of logs grasping a skinny tree that was bending under the strain. Waves made the pile rise and fall like it was inhaling and exhaling. Each time another tree or log came downstream and rammed into the pile, the concussion went through the pile and shook the tree. held onto the tree ready for the pile to break apart any moment and chew me up. I was a wet rag standing on the rollers of a laundry wringer.
Ryan and I spoke to each other periodically but spent most of the time quietly absorbed in the peril. We noted how much time had elapsed. How soon it would be dark. How might any potential rescuers find out that we're here. How could a rescue raft possibly land here given the force of the current? Should we swim for it before this little tree snaps and releases the log jumble? periodically caught the attention of our friends on the other island and traded pats on the head gestures to indicate we were okay for the moment.
After being marooned for 45 to 60 minutes, we noticed two kayakers floating downstream. They were laterally at about the same point on the river as us yet very far away, way over near the river right bank. I could make out from the way they gestured to each other that they noticed us. They seemed alarmed and confused by what they were seeing. Moments later they were downstream and out of sight. A short while later, we saw them walking upstream on the river right train tracks carrying their kayaks. Another short while after that, they paddled to us and landed at the downstream end of the nearer island. Thet advised the kayakers, to fetch us first, judging us to be in more danger than they were.
They took us both The kayaker with me said that he was going to tow me to Hot Springs behind his kayak. He gave me three simple instructions: 1) hold onto his stern, 2) kick as hard as I can, and 3) if he capsizes let go until he rolls up and tells me to grab on again.I was determined to comply with total devotion to the cause and be the best victim anyone could possibly be. Tapping into my workplace management training and couples counseling with my spouse, I knew that step one was to repeat Daniel's instructions back to him verbatim so that he could be certain I fully understood his instructions. Unfortunately, I was so addled with terror that got hung up on the proper order of the three instructions. The instructions were clear and present in my mind but for the life of me I couldn't think of the right order to say them in, as if that even mattered. My mouth moved a little and nothing came out.
The kayaker sais, “Leave the paddle. We're going." I hung my paddle by its grip as high as I could reach in the fork of a branch. We left. It was wonderful to be off that wood pile, headed anywhere. I obediently flutter kicked with what remaining vigor I had and probably augmented that with an occasional crawl strokes; I have no idea if it added any useful amount of locomotion. It didn't take long to cover the downstream distance to Hot Springs but ferrying laterally to river right consumed the entire trip. When we landed, Daniel departed immediately, carrying his kayak back up the railroad tracks for another rescue.
There were emergency responders loitering at the take-out. The parking lot was now somewhere in the river. A tow truck had pulled my car out of the water earlier in the day. Another truck was still immersed. It had floated a short distance and lodged in some trees.
Our instructor was at the take-out at least part of the time when I was there. He had caught up with my canoe downstream of Hot Springs, lodged it on shore, and walked back to the take-out. He had similarly recovered the other lost canoes.
The kayakers went upstream and towed our other two friends to the take-out. I'm really hazy on what happened from there. They told me later that they "watched in horror" as the wood pile on which Ryan and I were standing collapsed just a few minutes after Daniel and Ty took us away.
Some friends of Viki's paddling the river a few days later at normal flows recovered my canoe paddle. They found it lodged in the tree where I stashed it. She might remember how high up in the tree it was, I want to say 15'.
--Tom Welander, January 27, 2024
COMMENT: This is not the first time that paddlers who have travelled a long distance to a river proceeded with a planned trip despite dangerous high water. The momentum generated in these situations can lead to serious judgement errors. What is unique in this instance is that they were encouraged to do so by a very experienced instructor, showing that anyone can be caught up in the moment.
Tom Wellender
There are some differing details in my report that differ from Tom but I have a few more details I'd like to address that don't get touched on from my report:
- We did debrief the incident the next morning with Eli. I know there were a few incident reports submitted to the ACA on this incident with the only outcome being that Eli was forced to retire his certification.
- It was an initial certifying course, not a recert. Shane joined us during that day to recertify.
- The kayakers were able to reach me and Viki on their initial descent, we chatted with them, I didn't know how they could help so I told them "please, just go get help". That's when they went down stream and then walked back up to tell us their plan after seeing the water below us.
- Viki was borderline, hypothermic while we waited on the pinned wood. I was able to stay calm, collected, and alert through the situation (minus the moment that I almost passed out on the log I was pinned on). So I do recall a lot of the day with pretty good detail. My original report is a bit scattered and there are a lot of other details from that day that I'd be happy to share.
1. Basic Context: Location, Date, Type of Class, River, Weather/water/conditions, group composition
a. I would like the name of the trainer, so I may collect their narrative of the event. I will keep your/staff comments confidential, if you wish.
Answer: On Friday April 19, we were on the French Broad River Section 9 between Marshall NC and Hot Springs NC for our 3rd day of the course. The weather was rainy. And the cfs level was 5500 cfs when we put-on. The group anticipated a slight water level increase but were stoked to be out.
The trainer was Eli Helbert.
2. Beginnings to ‘the incident’: What caused/led to the misadventure (and other relevant details surrounding the situation)
Answer: we put on the water at 11:00am with water level at 5,500cfs. The river began to rise higher and faster than we could notice or anticipate. We made it to the typical take-out of Stackhouse at around 3:30pm with no major incidents and only a couple minor swims. When we reached Stackhouse we talked to a couple people that we saw who said the level had risen to 18,600cfs in Asheville. We estimate now that it was around 25,000cfs in Hot Springs. Our trainer, Eli, asked how everyone felt. Two of us (myself and Tom) felt good enough and energized to keep going as long as Eli felt good about continuing from Stackhouse. The rest of the group were not feeling good about running the next rapid (for clarification: there was a new rapid that had formed just below Stackhouse including a singular stand trough wave about 20 ft deep) and decided that they would rather walk around and put in past it and trusted Eli's judgment on the risk thereafter. One participant (Katie) did not feel comfortable continuing and refused to put back on the water and instead grabbed a ride back to the put-in.
As we approached the rapid Needle Rock, the alternate rapid around Kayaker's ledge, we were briefed to catch the eddie on the right side of a very large wave train. Near the bottom of this rapid, our boats hit a strange occurrence that flipped everyone's boats except for Eli. Eli was able to help one person back into a boat without a paddle. At this point, there were 4 of us in the water. We experienced very large and exhausting swims through numerous holes and waves. As we approached the next listed rapid (Frank Bell's), we individually were too exhausted to want to swim through more massive rapids and chose to swim to a clump of trees on an island that was completely submerged.
At this point, I still had a hold of my boat and my paddle. As I approached the trees, I caught a log strainer on my lower ribs, at which point I was forced to let go of my boat and paddle in order to lift myself up and be flushed over the log. I then was able to hold onto a tree and eventually swam to a spot where a co-participant (Viki) was standing on wood that had been collected and pinned against a tree. The other two swim victims (Ryan and Tom were together on more pinned wood about 40 yards river-left of us. We estimated the water level to be between 35,000cfs and 42,000cfs and possibly about 4:30 or 5:00pm. We waited as the water continued to rise and wood continued to build up and break off. Eventually, two kayakers came by and we were able to whistle them to our location. They decided to pull Ryan and Tom behind their kayaks and down the river where they could get to shore. They then came back up to collect Viki and then myself off of our location and downstream to onto shore. At this point, it was about 8:30pm and the level peaked at around 65,000cfs.
3. Situation management: What did the trainer and/or group do to navigate the situation.
Answer: we were all looking to Eli to make the judgement calls and decided to trust his judgement about continuing down from Stackhouse. When the flip incident occurred, Eli helped Shane into a boat and continued to try to assist people but was only able to take a headcount. As I was the last person to collect on the wood, Eli was able to get a head count on everyone except for me and had assumed I continued to float down, so he decided to paddle down to search. He was able to recover most canoes and get them to the riverside. When he got to the take-out, the fire department was there and refused to let Eli assist in any way to rescue us so he continued to attempt to collect boats.
During my swim, I attempted to make two wet entry rolls but couldn't collect the energy to complete them.
We, as victims, collaborated with the kayakers on how to get us out and in which order. I insisted on them taking Ryan and Tom off first as I did not like the look of their spot. As they were getting behind the kayakers, their entire stack of wood collapsed behind them.
Later, as they were taking Viki into the water, our spot also began to fail and I was forced to abandon my spot and swim to a single log that was more protected until they were able to bring me down.
4. Lingering effects/losses: What became of the incident and the management of the group? What gear was lost? Are students suffering any other losses?
Answer: Most of us met back up the next morning to debrief the incident. We decided that the water levels were too high on every river in the area and cut the course short with a plan to continue the last few hours on a 1-on-1 day a week later.
Viki lost her Blackfly Octane 85, Shane lost his Skeeter canoe, and the 5 of us all lost our paddles which were all Werner Bandit fiberglass paddles.
Caleb Parchman
To whom it may concern:
This report provides my best attempts to summarize the events of the ACA Level 4 Instructor Training being conducted by Eli Helbert on Friday April 19, 2019.
On the morning of the incident, it had been raining heavily for many hours. Local forecasts expected the rains to continue in a heavy and widespread manner for the duration of the day throughout much of the Southeast and across the entirety of the French Broad River watershed. As of that morning, the gauges of the major tributaries (Davidson River & French Broad @ Rosman) in the area were all vertically oriented, rising sharply. At 8am, the French Broad @ Marshall was at 4500cfs, already above what be considered a viable option for instruction. Driving to the river that morning, all the ditches and gullies and feeder creeks were running and brown to an extent that was quite unusual in the area. The river continued to rise, as the group continued to travel, through an area with cell reception, headed towards a river with multiple available online data points. At the put-in, Viki Austin expressed her concerns, both privately to Eli as well as to the group as a whole, that the river was too high and was clearly continuing to rise. Her concerns while acknowledged, were not taken seriously or given consideration. Her objections based on safety were brushed aside with a “it’ll be fine” attitude. By the time the group put on at 11am, the river was at around 7000cfs, well above what might reasonably considered appropriate for instructor training, and still rising rapidly. From the outset, river conditions dictated that there were no instructional opportunities presented or available: All group members were at their limit, or beyond it, just trying to keep it together.
Throughout the course of the day the river continued to rise. There was much carnage and many swims. At least one candidate was in tears due to the stress and fear. Rapids were scouted and portages required for many of the group. The river continued to rise.
After the rapid known as Pinball / Pitstop, which was what can only be called “huge” and washed into what at that point was a forest engulfed by a flooding river, the cohesion of the group started to break down. Some members were in full-on survival mode. Students were paddling in the trees - and hoping not to encounter strainers - in order to avoid being sucked into the main current with it’s flood stage features (exploding waves, terminal holes, etc.). There was no effective communication - verbal or visual - between the students and Eli nor among the students as a group.
The group was fractured. To reach the takeout at Stackhouse was a maneuver to great difficulty and high consequence. However, the group had planned to continue on to Hot Springs. One member of the group took off. At Stackhouse, the group was informed by others in the parking lot that the river was at 18,000cfs and was still on the rise. At that point, transportation was offered and was available to the group. They had the possibility and opportunity to get back to their vehicles and take off the river.
Eli pressed the group onward. The other group members, who had paid money for a certification that was required to earn their livelihoods, and who had arranged to spend 5 days receiving instruction with the hopes of earning certification, were offered no other alternative than to continue. Here Viki again raised her concerns, specifically that there would be no recovery pool or eddies below the wave trains at left of Kayakers’ Ledge & Frank Bell’s Rapid. These concerns were met with Eli’s false assurance that there would be pools after rapids. However, at Stackhouse, he did comment that the river was still on the rise, acknowledging the large amount of logs and trees in the main flow. Having been told the river was at 18,000 cfs, he acknowledged the river was still rising, and despite this information, insisted on continuing downstream.
After approximately an hour spent at Stackhouse, arranging transportation for the group member who was taking out, and having to scout the rapid downstream of Stackhouse, and for some of the group to portage once more, the river had continued to rise violently.
It was after Stackhouse, with the river well over 25,000cfs and fully in the trees that things really got out of control. Paddling the section left of the island at the rapid known as Kayakers’ Ledge / Needle Falls, All 5 of the remaining group members were violently flipped in the huge, chaotic waters. None of them were able to recover with a roll in those conditions. As the 2 channels reconvened, all 5 were swimming for their lives in flood conditions. They were unable to get to shore (which was a dangerous proposition, given the fast current running thru the trees, and with no more viable options, abandoned the canoes they had been staying with for flotation and swam for their lives into floating stainers and debris piles caught high in the trees of the island splitting the channel at Frank Bell’s Rapid.
Upon swimming into the trees, Viki her head violently, but was slowed enough to be able to swim into another floating pile of trees stuck downstream. Four other members of the group were clinging for their lives to floating trees and debris piles nearby. One other member was in the current, being washed down stream.
At this point, Eli paddled thru the slackwater caused by the debris piles, saw Viki and told her to “wait here” and went down stream to chase after the boats and equipment nearby. There he abandoned the 4 group members and did not return. The river was around 50,000cfs at that point. He did not return. They were stranded on floating debris, having swam more than a mile in a flood stage river. With no where to go, and a likely flush drowning awaiting downstream in Frank Bell’s Rapid or the huge whirlpools that form downstream, they waited. In shock, growing cold, and running out of daylight.
The four paddlers were rescued by 2 kayakers, who happened to paddle by. Each kayaker took a stranded paddler on the stern of their boat and got them safely to shore well below Frank Bell’s Rapid. The kayakers then carried their boats upstream on the railroad tracks to save the remaining 2 stranded people.
Two of the group walked down the track to Hot Springs on river left while the other two people were deposited on river right near the NOC Hot Springs take-out area, where they saw local EMS and SAR teams had been activated. However, given the conditions, those teams were not in a position to intervene.
While there were no major injuries, members of the group were in shock, bruised, mildly concussed, and generally half drowned and beat to hell.
There are a few other things I’d like to add after having folks approach me and offer their advice based on incomplete information. We were not stranded on Frank Bell’s Island. We were hanging on to the tops of the trees that were rooted on the island. A channel separated Tom and Ryan from Me and Caleb. Tom and Ryan’s purchase was deteriorating the fastest. Their trees were collapsing around them and floating away. The channel between us was too swift and full of debris for them to risk swimming to where Caleb and I were. Caleb asked the kayakers to rescue Tom and Ryan first and it was a good thing because their “island” was gone by the time the Daniel and Ty returned for us. Caleb and I were dealing with the tree/debris pile-ups at the upstream side that were cyclically building up and collapsing. One minute we’d be standing on a floating log that was braced up against a treetop in slack water and the next we’d be holding on in faster current and trying to keep our footing as the logs left and others came along, trying not to get our ankles crushed.
We were all dressed in drysuits but I for one was starting to get hypothermic because of the partial submersion. I think we were stranded for longer than Tom estimates. Of course, time got a little bent. But by the time I was on the tracks walking toward Hot Springs we were out of daylight. I’m guessing we were stranded for 1.5 hours at least. It was not a matter of hunkering down for the night stranded on an island in the middle of high flows and wishing someone had brought a lighter. We were lucky to have all found a place insulated from the worst of it and even luckier to have private boater rescue. Eli wasn’t coming. A helicopter wasn’t coming. A zodiac rescue boat wasn’t coming. I don’t think we would’ve made it through the night if Daniel and Ty hadn’t stepped in.
I saw them upstream and started blowing my whistle. Caleb joined in. I don’t think they would’ve noticed us otherwise. I asked them to go get help. As they told it to me, when they got to Hot Springs rescue personnel was focused on moving vehicles from the Hot Springs takeout. They told them of our situation and that we needed help. There was a hostile and unhelpful response let’s just say. They realized that they were our only hope and shouldered their kayaks up the tracks to help us. I believe rescue personnel tried to stop them. If not for their clear thinking, courage and heroism (and boating skills) I would not be here today.
There are a few places in Tom’s write-up that i would say differ from my experience. He speaks of the students washing “up onto those heaps of flotsam” at the upstream end of the island. Caleb and I encountered a 10’-15’ high strainer of trees at the upstream tip of the island that i tried very hard to not wash up on. It was a massive and actively adjusting strainer and it would have been catastrophic to get mixed up in it. I tried to eddy behind it. I didn’t know how much slack water i would encounter behind it so I cut my swimming line a little close and clocked my head on a log sticking out before I landed behind it all and grabbed a tree. It definitely stunned me for a bit. When I came to, I saw Caleb clinging to a tree just upstream of me. I saw Eli paddle up to me. I grabbed his bow. He said that he was going after Shane (the recert guy) and to let go. He told me to stay there. I inferred that he was getting help. Caleb swam the short distance to me and I relayed this to him. At least for me and Caleb, he did not “assist boaters up out of the water”. Caleb and I could see Ryan and Tom and were relieved that they were apparently OK, at least for the moment.
It was difficult to know what to do at this point. Caleb and I assessed our situation and discussed options. At one point we considered whether we should swim for it. I remembered that downstream of us was a RR bridge that had an abutment that protruded into the river and made a large pool (at least 1/3 of river width at normal flows). I imagined it to be a terminal eddy full of stuff that would beat me to hell. I’d already had the experience of trying to swim in this water and realized it was going to take me where it was going to take me. (Above Frank Bells I swam with all my might to river right where the RR tracks were. River left looked to be a mass of collapsing trees and floating debris piles and strong current through strainers. I was wearing myself out swimming right and was getting nowhere.) I didn’t think I could control whether I got sucked into the death eddy I thought was probably there and didn’t think we should swim unless our island collapsed and we were forced to.
Also Eli did not recover my canoe. A local in the Del Rio area found it sometime after the flood and about 20’ up in a tree. The pump was running when we parted ways so I think this is why she made it so far. The man kept it in his yard for about a year before deciding to post it for sale on Facebook. My name and number were on the hull of the boat and on the airbags so that didn’t help me in this situation.
Oh also, we don’t know what the river peak was. It hit the limit at 60,000 cfs and went through a period where it was off the chart then fell to 60 and continued to fall. Based on its trajectory, it looks like it might have peaked closer to 70k but we won’t know for sure.
Virginia Austin
