Accident Date: Saturday, 28 July 2007
Accident Time: Between 4 and 4:30pm (estimate)
River: Kicking Horse River Section: Lower canyon
Map: 082N07 (1:50,000 topographic) Accident Site: Relative: First rail bridge below put-in (~1.5 km downstream) Absolute: N 51 18.007' W 116 53.859' (see notes below)
Grade of River Section: Class III-IV Grade at Accident Site: Class II+
River Level: See attached image from http://scitech.pyr.ec.gc.ca/waterweb/fullgraph.asp Absolute: 79.8 @12pm on the bridge gauge in Golden Relative: Medium flow River Character: Continuous single channel
Water Temperature: 7C (unconfirmed estimate)
Weather: See attached image from http://www.climate.weatheroffice.ec.gc.ca/climateData/canada_e.html Air Temperature: 32C Wind: None Precipitation: None Visibility Unlimited (no cloud) Group type: Private recreational Group size: 3 (2 kayakers, 1 riverboarder)
Number of victims: 1 Nature of Injuries: Death due to drowning Contributing Factors: (See notes below) Victim: Name: Linda Englehart From: Calgary, Alberta Sex: Female Age: 27 Victim's Experience: 3 years kayaking, 4th time on this river Group Experience: Riverboarder: 4 years, 25+ times on this river Kayaker: 10 years, first time on this river Victim's Boat: Type: Creek kayak Model: Eskimo Topo Construction: Plastic (blow molded polyethylene) Condition: Excellent Floatation: None Victim's Equipment: Composite helmet Sprayskirt Booties (see below) 3mm farmer john wetsuit Long sleeve splash top (unknown make) Neoprene gloves PFD (unknown make but rodeo vest style) Whistle River knife Equipment used in rescue: Carlson riverboard River knife 2-way radio Helicopter
Description: The group was descending the lower canyon of the Kicking horse with the riverboarder in front, followed ~20m behind by the first kayaker, followed ~15m behind by the victim (also in a kayak). Approximately 2km from the put-in and roughly 200m upstream of the first railroad bridge in the canyon, the first kayaker crossed with the main flow from the right to the left side of the river and narrowly missed a pourover caused by a large rock in midstream. The pourover was a boatlength in width and masked by the milky grey water and glare of the afternoon sun.
Immediately after clipping the left corner of the pourover, the kayaker turned to face upstream and held position roughly 10m downstream of the pourover. The victim paddled hard left to avoid the pourover but went over it at a 45 degree angle. The recirculation flow behind the pourover flipped and held the victim sideways and upside down in her boat. The victim made four unsuccessful attempts to roll during which her head did not clear the surface. The kayaker could not see on which side (upstream or downstream, onside or offside) the victim attempted to roll.
After 20-30 seconds of complete submersion, the victim performed a wet exit from the kayak after which she was pulled downstream out of the recirculation flow. The victim's noseplug and both booties were pulled off by the force of the current. The victim, still holding her paddle, grabbed the rear grab loop of the first kayak as she drifted past.
From the pourover to the rail bridge (~200m) the river makes a sweeping right turn with a rock wall along the left bank. To avoid rocks along the left bank, the kayaker and victim had to remain in the main flow making the eddy on the left upstream of the rail bridge an impossibility. The only other eddy in this section was on the left above a rock garden immediately downstream of the rail bridge. The kayaker attempted to tow the victim into this eddy but the drag of the victim prevented them punching across the eddy line. The rock garden at the base of the eddy funneled current away from shore back into the main flow and the force of the kayaker paddling upstream and the current downstream made it too hard for the victim to hold the stern grab loop. The kayaker asked the victim "Are you OK?", to which she responded "No".
The riverboarder, now just downstream of the victim, let go of the victim's booties that he had recovered and told the victim to get on the riverboard. The victim seemed to have trouble with the riverboard, holding it vertically in the water initially instead of climbing on top. The riverboarder had to physically grab the victim's hands and place them on the front grab loops.
As the victim transferred to the riverboard she said either "There's my paddle" or "Where's my paddle?". The kayaker saw the paddle rise to the surface about 3m downstream and proceeded to grab it while the riverboarder assisted the victim onto the riverboard. After fetching the paddle, the kayaker saw the victim's boat in midstream nearby and gave chase. Just as the kayaker reached the victim's boat he heard the riverboarder yelling "Grab the handles!". The kayaker looked upstream over his shoulder and saw the riverboarder and victim (still conscious) caught in a small hole close to the left bank. (The kayaker finally bulldozed the victim's kayak to shore ~900m downstream of the first rail bridge, dragged it back upstream 100m to a point where it was visible from both the river and the rail bed, grabbed a throw rope and first aid kit from hit kayak, and ran back upstream along the rail bed to assist in the rescue.)
The riverboarder and victim managed to flush out of the first hole but got stuck in a second, stickier hole just downstream. While recirculating in the second hole, the victim slid off the riverboard and under water. The riverboarder grabbed around underwater for the victim in the hole's foamy backwash. He managed to get hold of her limp arm and pulled her from the hole but struggled to both keep her head above water and get her to shore while being pushed over rocks himself by the strong current with a riverboard tethered to him. He managed to manhandle the unconscious victim to the edge of the river 400m downstream of the first bridge. He removed his helmet and began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.
Some minutes later a group of 4 commercial rafts from Wet'n'Wild appeared upstream and the riverboarder flagged them down. A river knife was used to remove the victim's PFD and drytop and two raft guides and two rafting customers (both registered nurses) took turns administering CPR. The raft guides used two-way radios to call in an Emergency Rescue Technician, who arrived by helicopter within about 20 minutes.
Approximately 1 hour after being recovered from the river, the victim was air-lifted by a second helicopter to Golden. Although she never regained consciousness, doctors in Golden were able to get her heart going and she was immediately evacuated by air ambulance to hospital in Calgary. However, she remained comatose until her death the following afternoon. The Coroner reported the cause of death as drowning with no other injuries sustained.
Notes ----- · The group met in Golden at 11:30am, began paddling the upper Kicking Horse at 1pm, drove to the start of the lower canyon at 3pm, and finally arrived in Golden after the accident at 6:30pm. All other time durations in the description above are approximate and based on best guesses since the rescuers did not log the time of events during the rescue. · Linda had no trouble on the upper section of the Kicking Horse, which the group ran earlier that afternoon. She was in excellent shape and was not tired. She had been kayaking for at least 3 seasons and observing her that day the Kicking Horse was not beyond her skill level. She had already finished the hard part of the canyon section when the accident occurred. · Linda mentioned at the start of the canyon section that she had a -1.0 prescription, which is very slight. However, the milky water and glare of the afternoon sun made it extremely difficult to spot the pourover from upstream. The first kayaker turned upstream immediately after barely missing it himself only to see Linda fall in instead. · Linda mentioned in the parking lot in Golden that she had forgotten her booties at home that morning and had purchased some ill-fitting, calf-high, 'better than nothing' booties for her feet on the drive to Golden. · When asked "Are you OK?", Linda replied "No" in a calm, matter-of-fact tone. It is not known what she meant by this. · It is not known if Linda wore an insulation layer under her paddle top. · It is not known what caused Linda to lose consciousness; however, she spent a considerable time completely upside down in the initial pourover and lost her nose plugs when she finally surfaced. It is possible that she swallowed or inhaled water during the initial capsize and that's why she replied "No" when asked if she was OK. · Both rescuers observed that Linda had difficulty getting on to and holding on to the riverboard. Although confusion and loss of fine motor control are symptoms of hypothermia, she had been in the water for only about 2-3 minutes at that point (albeit, in bare feet since the current swept her booties off). She lost consciousness about 2 minutes after that. · Although the group was small (3 people), it's not clear what help more people could have offered. Only one person can tow a swimmer - which both the kayaker and riverboarder did in turn at different stages of the rescue. It is conceivable that other rescuers could have paddled downstream ahead of the swimmer, jumped out of their boat, and used a throw bag to assist from shore; however, no kayaker is going to willingly get out of their boat on shore while a swimmer is still in the water. · The riverboarder used a Carlson riverboard (www.carlsonriverboard.com) - the same model used by emergency services the world over for river rescue. After the victim lost consciousness, it is unlikely she could have been moved to shore by any faster means. When revisiting the accident site a year later at similar flow, it was observed to take 90 seconds to float from the second hole where Linda lost consciousness to the rock where she was pulled from the river. · On arrival in Golden, the remaining two group members immediately went to the hospital in Golden. After learning the victim had been air-lifted to Calgary they went to the RCMP station in Golden where each provided a police statement. · The accident location indicated (n 51 18.007' w 116 53.859') is where the victim was pulled from the river. If you punch that into Google maps it puts you on the other side of the river from the actual location (on river left).
Lessons Learned: --------------- It is frustrating that we (the rescuers) can't think of anything we are likely to do differently in the same situation in the future. The best that we can offer as conclusions are the following points of safety which were reinforced by this experience: · Always wear a whistle on the outside of your clothing. It should be both visible and accessible (i.e. not in a pocket). Three blasts of a whistle is a universal and unmistakable signal for help. A whistle should be the first recourse in an emergency (not hand waving, shouting, or paddle signals). ·
Talk to the victim. Find out exactly what's wrong - did they hit their head, swallow water, cut/break/scrape something? It is important to assess the state of the victim as well as the state of the situation. · Not knowing CPR is equivalent to not knowing how to roll. Take a course! · A river knife was used in this rescue to quickly cut away the victim's lifejacket and paddle jacket in order to perform CPR. This is probably a more common use for river knives than freeing people from pinned boats and rope entanglements, yet it is rarely mentioned in safety literature or courses. · The raft guides were in the water running to assist the rescue before their rafts touched shore. All paddlers should share this attitude: don't dress in case of a swim but in case of a rescue.
Paddlers who dress too lightly because they think themselves unlikely to swim are a liability in a rescue situation. You must react fast and be willing and able to get wet without hesitation. · It is possible that the victim's boat could have been rescued faster were it equipped with float bags. However, this is unlikely since there were no eddies between the first and second rail bridges to tow or push the boat into. ·
When using a riverboard to rescue a conscious victim, a cross-hold with the high flotation of the board centered between the two swimmers) is probably the most stable when two people are trying to use the board simultaneously. Unfortunately it does not guarantee that both will be able to hang on when dumped over a pour-over. · Both rescuers and victim must forget about loss of property or equipment and focus first on getting the victim to shore. · Although it is not known if Linda was trying to roll on her 'on' or 'off' side, it is a good idea for kayakers to be proficient at rolling on both sides in case they are ever caught in a hole with their 'off' side downstream.
